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Abstract
The rise in non-tariff protectionist measures has been associated to the weakness in global 
trade over the last few years. We investigate the effect of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) on exports 
growth over the period 2009-2013 using administrative data at the fi rm-product-destination 
level in Spain. According to our fi ndings, non-tariff protectionist measures signifi cantly reduce 
exports growth at the product-destination level. Moreover, NTBs also hinder exports growth 
at the fi rm level and negatively affect other fi rm outcomes such as productivity growth. In 
contrast, the impact of liberalizing non-tariff measures is not statistically signifi cant.
Keywords: protectionism, non-tariff measures, fi rm level data.
JEL classifi cation: F10, F30, F40, G15, G21, G32.
Resumen
La implantación de medidas proteccionistas no arancelarias se ha asociado a la debilidad 
del comercio mundial en los últimos años. En este trabajo investigamos los efectos que 
dichas barreras comerciales no arancelarias pueden haber tenido en el crecimiento de las 
exportaciones españolas durante el período 2009-2013 utilizando datos administrativos a 
nivel de empresa-producto-destino. De acuerdo con nuestros resultados, las medidas pro-
teccionistas no arancelarias reducen signifi cativamente el crecimiento de las exportaciones a 
nivel de empresa-producto-destino. Además, estas barreras no arancelarias también reducen 
el crecimiento de las exportaciones a nivel de empresa y afectan negativamente a otras varia-
bles como el crecimiento de la productividad. Por el contrario, el impacto positivo de la elimi-
nación de algunas de estas barreras no arancelarias no resulta estadísticamente signifi cativo.
Palabras clave: proteccionismo, barreras no arancelarias, datos a nivel de empresa.
Códigos JEL: F10, F30, F40, G15, G21, G32.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 7 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1814
1 Introduction
This paper investigates the consequences of trade protectionism in the form of non-tariff barriers
over the period 2009-2013. Periods of trade liberalization have been widely studied in the literature
(Lileeva and Trefler, 2010; Topalova and Khandelwal, 2011; Pavcnik, 2002; Amiti and Konings, 2007)
but protectionist episodes have been paid much less attention until now. However, protective policies
are playing an increasingly important role that goes hand in hand with the rise of anti-globalization
episodes like Trump’s election or Brexit.
Given the little maneuver that developed countries have to raise tariff rates due to the existence
of the WTO and other trade agreements, post-crisis economies have decided to implement a ’murkier’
protectionism in the form of non-tariff measures (Datt et al. 2011; Baldwin and Evenett, 2009). Non-
tariff measures (NTMs) are harder to discover and many of them are only detected some time after
they have been implemented, but undeniably there has been an increase in the use of NTMs since the
Global Financial Crisis. Many developed economies opted for subsidizing their national industries
and financing bailouts which in turn distorted international trade. Also, NTMs are adopted in the
form of trade volume restrictions, which limits quantities and hence are much more distortive than
usual tariff measures.1
The recent increase in non-tariff protectionism measures is a reason of concern for economists
and international organizations. According to WTO (WTO, 2009), 1,243 new trade measures were
uncovered over the last years being the majority non-tariff protectionist measures. In the case of
trade policies affecting Spanish exports, NTMs outnumbered tariff changes and they were clearly
biased towards protectionist policies (see Table 4). Since the positive relationship between trade
openness and consumer welfare has been widely documented in the literature, the concern now is
whether the rise in non-tariff protectionism might have consequences as strong as the effects from
trade liberalizations but with opposite sign.
In order to shed light on this issue, we combine non-tariff measures at the product-country level
over the years 2009-2013 from the Global Trade Alert project with firm-product-country information
on exports from the Banco de Espan˜a’s Balance of Payments as well as firm Balance Sheet information
from the Spanish Mercantile Register. In particular, we consider all NTMs implemented by the rest
of the world and potentially affecting Spanish exporters. Armed with this database, we regress
export growth at the firm-product-destination level on the non-tariff measures affecting Spain by
product-destination. To enhance identification, we compare exports growth of the same product to
1Despite not being that constrained to tariff bounds imposed by the WTO as developed economies, developing
countries have also broadly used NTMs since they are limited by tariffs of regional trade agreements and the increasing
interest for health and environmentally friendly products. For instance, the members of MERCOSUR have been active
users of non-tariff measures.
the same country and by the same firm before and after a NTM is implemented (i.e. we include
firm-product-country fixed effects). Alternatively, we compare exports growth of the same product
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by the same firm in the same year to countries in which the product is differentially affected by
NTMs (i.e. firm-product-year fixed effects).2
According to our results, non-tariff protectionist measures significantly reduce export growth.
The estimated reduction in exports due to these trade barriers is sizable. It ranges between 37 and
74% of the average export growth by firm-product-destination in our sample. In contrast, the impact
of liberalizing measures is not statistically significant. Turning to the firm-level analysis, we find that
non-tariff protectionist measures significantly reduce overall export growth implying that firms are
not able to undo the negative shock induced by the NTMs by resorting to other product-destination
markets. Moreover, firms more exposed to NTMs present significantly lower productivity growth,
which points to the presence of important aggregate costs of NTMs in terms of consumer welfare.
The present paper contributes to the literature in three dimensions. First, the combination
of non-tariff barriers to trade with firm-product-destination data allows estimating the effects of
trade protectionism on exports and productivity at a very granular level.3 Second, the use of non-
tariff measures in the post-crisis period 2009-2013 allows us to explore potential non-linearities by
comparing the effects of protectionism and liberalizing policies. Third, we analyze Spain as a ’passive’
country, that is, how Spanish exporters are affected when other countries change their trade policies.
Thus, we do not analyze the effects of a trade liberalization of a specific country and its consequences
on that particular country.4
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3
presents the empirical strategy together with the baseline results at the product-destination level.
Section 4 explores additional exercises as well as robustness checks. Section 5 discusses the analysis
at the firm level considering not only export growth but also other firm outcomes. Finally, Section
6 concludes.
2It is worth highlighting three caveats of our analysis from the onset. First, we rely in the protectionist versus
liberalizing labeling conducted by the GTA experts, which is not officially validated by the World Trade Organization.
Second, in spite of the granularity of our approach, there are threats to identification since NTBs might be implemented
to those product-country pairs in which Spanish exports perform better. Third, due to data limitations we consider
only the intensive margin of trade, while some of the effects of NTMs may operate through the extensive margin. We
discuss these issue in more detail below.
3Given the nature of our NTMs data, we focus on changes in protectionism policies and trade flows rather than
stocks.
4Some recent papers investigate the effects of China’s adhesion to the WTO on the United States (Amiti et al.,
2017; Bai and Stumpner, 2017; Handley and Limao, 2013).
1.1 Related literature
Our paper is related to two different strands of the literature. On the one hand, there is a vast
empirical literature about the effects of tariff cuts on trade and other economic outcomes using firm-
level data. On the other hand, there is a more recent and scarce literature about the consequences
of non-tariff measures (NTMs) using more aggregated data.
The literature on NTMs suggests, in general, that non-tariff barries harm international trade.
Theoretical papers on the effects of distinct NTMs predict negative effects on trade. For instance,
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Bagwatti (1968) and Shibata (1968) debate on the equivalence between the protective effect from
tariffs to that of quotas. Moreover, recent empirical evidence has been provided on the issue as well.
Murina and Nicita (2017) test the effect of sanitary and phitosanitary measures (henceforth SPS) on
European agriculture from low income economies, showing a negative effect in EU’s imports. Kee
et al. (2009) show that NTMs add an 87% of trade restrictiveness (defined as the tariff that should
be applied instead of all the trade protection mechanism to leave exports/imports at their current
level) to that imposed by tariffs. Kee et al. (2013) show that tariffs and antidumping duties explain
only a small fraction of the 2008-2009 collapse in world trade. Conesa and Timini (2018) distinguish
between technical and non-technical trade barriers, showing a positive effect of the former and a
negative effect of the latter.
Turning to the literature about the effects of tariff cuts, research regarding the relationship
between productivity and trade liberalization has also been vastly developed using micro-data. Along
these lines, the empirical analysis of the welfare benefits of tariff cuts is typically based on firm-
level productivity measures due to the difficulty to quantify consumer welfare.5 A reduction in
tariffs decreases the threshold marginal costs for which it is worth to enter the market. Thus, when
trade liberalization happens, the most unproductive firms are forced to leave the market due to the
presence of foreign competitors, while the best firms can take advantage of the increased size of the
market (Melitz, 2003; Melitz and Trefler, 2012). Also, recent work by Bustos (2011) and subsequent
applications (e.g. Wagner, 2014) show the relationship between technological spending, productivity
and exports. Given all these positive effects from trade liberalizations on productivity and welfare,
there are reasons of concern about the recent rise in protectionist measures.
However, not only positive consequences of trade liberalization have been documented in the lit-
erature. When analyzing the bilateral tariff cuts between the US and Canada, Trefler (2004) shows
that trade liberalization led to the exit of the most unproductive firms. As these companies closed,
substantial losses of employment took place in hand with considerable increases in labour productiv-
ity. This phenomenon reflects the conflict between the short-run adjustment costs for stakeholders
5Melitz and Trefler (2012) summarize gains from trade openness through three different channels: i) gains from
love for variety, ii) gains from increased productivity, and iii) increases in technology spending on behalf of firms.
of closing companies and displaced workers and the long-run gains from increased efficiency and con-
sumer welfare improvement. Other papers find solid evidence that liberalizations reduced poverty
for developing countries (Topalova, 2007, 2010), and that his effect was higher for regions with more
flexible labour laws and the regions that were less exposed to tariff cuts.
2 Data
We combine non-tariff measures at the product-country level from the Global Trade Alert project
with firm-product-country information from the Banco de Espan˜a’s Balance of Payments and firm
Balance Sheet information from the Spanish Mercantile Register over the years 2009-2013.
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2.1 Firm-level Balance of Payments database
We exploit a unique administrative database of Spanish exporters for the years 2009 to 2013. This
dataset, provided by the Banco de Espan˜a, contains the micro data information used to construct
the official Spanish Balance of Payment Statistics. For each exporter we observe the fiscal id and the
value of exports at the product-destination level. The dataset accounts for around 97% of aggregate
Spanish exports, as we can see in Figure 1, and includes transactions with 242 partner countries and
119 types of products harmonized under the system HS-2.6
In table 1, we present the descriptive statistics for the Balance of Payments dataset. As shown,
our sample includes data for more than 20,000 Spanish firms, whose average volume of exports
revolves around two million euros in the covered sample. The destinations to which these exports
were headed ranges from 1 to 7, with the average firm exporting to 3 different countries. Regarding
the number of products, most firms focus their exporting activities on approximately 2 different
products at the 2-digit HS level.
2.2 Quasi-census balance sheet data
In order to conduct the firm-level analysis in Section 5, we use administrative data taken from the
Spanish Commercial Registry, which contains the balance sheets of the universe of Spanish companies
given the firms’ legal obligation to deposit their balance sheets on the Commercial Registry.7 For
6To be more concrete, the database covers all transactions with foreign trade partners above 50,000 Euros. We start
our analysis in 2009 using exports growth between 2008 and 2009 because the reporting threshold was lower (12,500
Euros) until 2008 making growth rates potentially misleading for some firms exporting around the thresholds in that
year. Also, the high reporting threshold complicates the measurement of the extensive margin of trade (entry/exit)
in our database.
7In particular, we combine two alternative databases independently constructed from the Commercial Registry,
namely, Central de Balances Integrada (CBI) from the Banco de Espan˜a and SABI from Bureau Van Dijk (used to
construct the Spanish and Portuguese samples of AMADEUS). The resulting database includes around 1,000,000 firms
in each year from 2000 to 2013 and it is only available for researchers undertaking projects for the Banco de Espan˜a.
each firm, among other variables, it includes information on: name, fiscal identifier; sector of activity
(4-digit NACE Rev. 2 code); 5-digit zip code location; annual net operating revenue; material
expenditures (cost of all raw materials and services purchased by the firm in the production process);
number of employees, labor expenditures (total wage bill, including social security contributions);
and total fixed assets.
Our final sample covers balance sheet information for a total of 1,801,955 firms with an average
of 993,876 firms per year. The firm-level database covers around 85-90% of the firms in the non-
financial market economy for all size categories in terms of both turnover and number of employees.
Moreover, the correlation between micro-aggregated employment (and output) growth and the Na-
tional Accounts counterparts is around 0.95 over the 2003-2013 period (see Figure 1). Almunia et
al. (2018) describe this database in greater detail.
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2.3 Global Trade Alert (GTA) database
We use the Global Trade Alert (GTA) database for identifying the implementation of non-tariff
measures affecting Spain. This new database gathers information about all protectionist policies
taken around the globe beginning in 2008, as well as valuable information on these policies such as
the affected and implementing countries, affected products (at 6-digit HS level), date of initiation and
Table 1: Summary statistics from BP data.
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Number of products
p10 1 1 1 1 1
Mean 1.74 1.78 1.81 1.84 1.86
Median 1 1 1 1 1
p90 3 3 3 3 4
Number of destinations
p10 1 1 1 1 1
Mean 2.91 3.01 3.11 3.23 3.29
Median 1 1 1 2 2
p90 6 7 7 7 7
Exports (EUR thousands)
p10 61 63 65 68 70
Mean 1,734 1,931 2,070 2,199 2,256
Median 324 350 376 389 404
p90 4,687 5,200 5,454 5,726 5,884
Number of firms 22,543 22,524 23,442 23,619 23,496
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end of the policies as well as a classification according to whether the policy is harmful or liberalizing
when it comes to international trade. An advantage of the GTA database over traditional sources
of information like the WTO I-TIP database is that WTO only registers those measures explicitly
announced to the WTO. In contrast, the GTA database is collected by a group of specialists in
international trade and includes all measures and not only those officially recorded by the WTO.
The creation of this database was motivated by the increase in protectionist non-tariff measures
during the last years. Since the inception of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and other inter-
national trade agreements, tariff barriers are now more difficult to implement than ever before. This
is why countries have turned to non-tariff measures (NTMs) in order to protect their internal mar-
kets. According to recent GTA reports, most of these protectionist policies have been implemented
by G20 economies, which make them even more relevant.
Table 2 shows the Spanish products at a 2-digit level disaggregation that have experienced most
trade measures coming from the rest of the world during the period 2009-2013. We acknowledge
that some policies are likely to be more influential than others, and thus, a product affected by less
policies can be more harmed/benefited than one with more. However, it provides a good idea of
which products are the protectionist targets of most countries. Some of these products like vehicles,
pharmaceutical products, chemicals and basic metals have a big share on Spanish trade, both in
imports and exports.
Table 3 shows that large trading partners have been very active when implementing non-tariff
measures (NTMs). Countries like Germany, China, Russia, Brazil or France, who have important
Table 2: Spanish products more affected by foreign NTBs.
Product Total NTB Liberalizing Protectionist Indeterminate
Articles of iron or steel. 284 15 257 12
Iron and steel. 270 10 240 20
Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts thereof. 201 29 154 18
Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof. 189 25 142 22
Vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling-stock, and parts and accessories thereof. 156 15 119 22
Organic chemicals. 86 4 72 10
Plastics and articles thereof. 71 7 52 12
Miscellaneous chemical products. 64 6 50 8
Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation; bituminous substances. 62 5 47 10
Inorganic chemicals; organic or inorganic compounds of precious metals. 61 4 50 7
Rubber and articles thereof. 54 6 41 7
Pharmaceutical products. 52 5 41 6
Optical, photographic, cinematographic, measuring, medical or surgical instruments. 52 9 38 5
Fish and crustaceans, molluscs and other aquatic invertebrates. 51 4 39 8
shares of the Spanish trade, have been among the most active ones regarding the implementation of
NTMs. A total of 1,340 non-tariff measures have been taken in that period against Spain, 137 of
which were classified as liberalizing, 1,118 as protectionist and the rest have an indeterminate effect.8
8In order to capture the scope of these measures, we report pairs of measures and products in Table 3. For
instance, if the same measure affected 2 distinct products, we report 2 measures in order to capture the magnitude of
the trade barriers imposed by foreign economies.
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Table 3: Number of NTB policies implemented by the rest of the world that affect Spain.
Country Total NTB Liberalizing Protectionist Indeterminate
India 1,000 138 762 100
US 490 34 433 23
China 263 23 226 14
Brazil 236 5 221 10
Russia 162 6 148 8
Argentina 128 - 114 14
Venezuela 117 69 47 1
Indonesia 99 13 81 5
Turkey 77 - 77 5
Germany 50 1 49 6
Algeria 47 - 4 43
Saudi Arabia 44 - 44 -
France 45 1 34 12
Kazakhstan 39 - 39 2
Korean Republic 38 2 35 1
Finally, Table 4 shows the amount of non-tariff and tariff measures that affect Spanish trade.
NTMs have clearly outnumbered tariff changes during the last years. More concretely, most protec-
tive measures have taken the form of NTMs while tariff measures have been liberalizing in majority.
Since the mechanisms of the WTO and other trade agreements have imposed difficulties for rising
tariffs, it seems that countries are turning to NTMs as the way out to protect their national indus-
tries. Sometimes NTMs are also imposed when the country is suffering uncompetitive behavior from
a country abroad or when the health and safety standards are at stake.
Table 4: Tariff vs non-tariff measures affecting Spanish exports.
Tariff Protectionist Liberalizing Indeterminate Non-tariff Protectionist Liberalizing Indeterminate
2008 5 3 2 - 157 140 1 16
2009 299 82 201 16 578 519 26 33
2010 385 77 293 15 611 493 55 63
2011 372 83 269 20 522 418 68 36
2012 432 174 257 1 618 589 17 12
2013 327 123 198 6 869 619 154 96
Total 1820 542 1220 58 3355 2778 321 256
In the GTA database, measures are classified according to their effect. Protectionist measures
include those policies which hinder international competition and grants benefits to local producers.
Examples of such policies include subsidies for exporting firms, requirements to buy local inputs,
tax-based incentives to export or the implementation of import and export quotas. Most of the
NTMs adopted since 2008 have had a strong distortionary character as these barriers do not affect
trade only through prices but also through quantities.
On the contrary, liberalizing measures are the ones that favor competition at the international
scale. Instances of these policies include the elimination of quotas or bureaucratic requirements to
export or import and other similar measures. These policies represent only the 11.6% of the NTMs
that affect Spain adopted between 2008 and 2013. Nevertheless, it is worth to notice that measures
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keep following the trend of liberalization that began decades ago. Lastly, there is an indeterminate
category where we include policies whose effects are not clear yet. Some examples of this category
include policies which are not targeted explicitly towards trade, but may affect it indirectly somehow.
Needless to say, both the compilation and the labeling of the NTMs available in the GTA database
crucially depend on the GTA experts criteria. Visual inspection of the measures included in the
database reveals that they all seem reasonably labeled. However, we acknowledge that some contro-
versy may remain with respect to the labeling of some included NTMs as well as the possibility of
some missing NTMs not included in the database. More details on the non-tariff measures included
in the GTA database can be found in Appendix A.
3 Empirical analysis at the product-destination level
3.1 Econometric model
In order to identify the effect of non-tariff measures on export performance at the product-destination
level, we consider the following specification:
Δ lnXipd,t = βNTMpd,t−1 + Fixed Effects + ipdt (1)
where X refers to export volume of product p to country d from firm i in year t.9 NTMpd,t−1 is a
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if there is at least one non-tariff measure affecting product
p and country d in year t− 1. The measure can be either protectionist (NTMPROTpd,t−1 ) or liberalizing
(NTMLIBEpd,t−1). Finally, different sets of Fixed Effects are included in the specifications in order to
consider alternative strategies to enhance identification.
In particular, we consider three types of configurations. First, we exploit within time variation by
including firm-product-country fixed effects. Identification is thus based on a diff-in-diff strategy that
compares the change in exports in the same firm-product-country triplet before and after the non-
tariff protectionism measure. Second, we include firm-product-year fixed effects and use a diff-in-diff
strategy comparing the change in exports for the same firm-product-year triplet across destinations
(countries) with and without NTBs implemented against Spain in the same year. Third, we include
firm-country-year fixed effects so that identification is based on between product variation for the
same firm-country-year triplet. We also add some relevant covariates to these configurations such as
tariff barriers to control for possible correlations.
We argue that our identification strategy based on a very granular approach allows us to claim
that our β estimates capture the effect from NTMs to exports growth of Spanish firms. However,
feedback effects from exports performance to NTMs implementation may represent a threat to our
identification. For instance, if NTBs affecting Spain are introduced in those country-product pairs
9Crucially, we only consider here the intensive margin of exports growth due to the high reporting threshold in
our dataset. However, we acknowledge that NTMs may also have effects in the extensive margin.
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in which Spanish exporters perform particularly well. In our case, there are two points that alleviate
this concern: (i) most of the NTMs in the data are implemented to protect certain national products
or industries but are not targeted to particular countries, especially in the case of Spain as a part
of the EU;10 (ii) tariffs at the country-product level also proxy for this potential reverse causality
concern to the extent that trading partners also target the best performing country-products through
10For instance, the Buy American requirement in the ’American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009’, one of
the largest NTBs in the data, required all of the iron, steel, and other manufactured goods used in the program to be
made in the United States. Therefore, all US trading partners are equally affected by this measure.
tariffs. However, our main estimates remain unaltered when controlling for tariffs in the regressions.
Three further comments regarding our empirical strategy are warranted. First, our approach is
based on policy changes and trade flows while the literature traditionally considers the stocks of
tariffs/protectionism and imports/exports. Given the nature of the GTA database, which compiles
information on implementation and termination of different NTMs, it is more appropriate to focus
on their effects on growth rates. Second, despite we acknowledge they might be relevant, we abstract
from potential non-linear effects depending on the initial stock of protectionism for each country-
product pair since we do not have this information readily available. Third, since we analyze NTMs
potentially affecting Spanish exports (e.g. phitosanitary requisites for Spanish firms to enter certain
foreign markets) we do not explore their effects on Spanish imports that would be more difficult to
rationalize.
Finally, it is also worth noting that we consider a partial equilibrium approach in line with the
empirical literature on tariff cuts at the firm level summarized above. This is so because in a context
of general equilibrium, we should include in our regressions not only the measures that affect Spain
but also all the other measures taken in the rest of the world. For instance, the protectionist measures
taken by the US against France will indirectly affect Spanish exports.
3.2 Baseline results
Table 5 shows our baseline estimates over the whole period 2009-2013 including three different groups
of fixed effects. Estimates in column (1) are identified from variation over time. In particular, the
inclusion of firm × country × product fixed effects implies that we compare the same triplet firm-
product-country before and after the introduction of the non-tariff barrier (NTB). The estimate
indicates that the average growth rate of exports is 4.8 pp. smaller when a protectionism non-
tariff measure is introduced. In columns (2)-(4) we show that this effect is robust to alternative
configurations of fixed effects exploiting variation over time.
In column (5), we include firm × product × year fixed effects so that identification is based on
variation across countries of the same firm-product-year triplet. In particular, we compare a firm
exporting the same product in the same year to countries implementing NTBs against Spain with
the same firm-product-year exporting to other countries not implementing any NTB against Spain.
The estimated effect is again negative, large and statistically significant at conventional significance
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levels. Export growth in the same firm-product-year to those countries implementing protectionism
non-tariff measures against Spain is, on average, 3.1 pp. lower than exports to other countries without
NTBs. Column (6) illustrates that this effect remains robust and significant when we include firm
× year together product × year fixed effects instead of the triplet firm × product × year.
Table 5: Effect of protectionist non-tariff measures on export growth.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
NTMPROTpd,t−1 -0.048*** -0.048*** -0.047*** -0.025*** -0.031*** -0.024*** -0.003 -0.014
(s.e.) (0.017) (0.012) (0.013) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.046) (0.010)
R2 0.24 0.24 0.11 0.22 0.29 0.22 0.43 0.22
# obs 132,381 146,736 165,245 148,320 129,807 148,313 43,855 148,253
# firms 12,564 10,327 14,516 10,439 8,771 10,438 5,170 10,438
# countries 187 188 189 196 196 196 145 184
# products 118 118 118 118 117 117 118 118
Fixed effects:
Firm × country × product YES NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Firm × year NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Firm NO NO YES NO NO NO NO NO
Year YES NO YES NO NO NO NO NO
Product × country NO YES YES NO NO NO NO NO
Product NO NO NO YES NO NO YES YES
Country NO NO NO YES YES YES NO NO
Product × year NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO
Country × year NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES
Firm × product × year NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO
Firm × country × year NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO
Notes. Dependent variable is export growth at the firm-country-product level (Δ lnXipd,t). Sample covers 2009-2013.
Standard errors are clustered at the product-destination level.
Column (7) reports the estimates when including firm × country × year fixed effects so that
identification is based on variation across products of the same firm-country-year triplet. This im-
plies that we are comparing the same firm exporting different products to the same country, some
products affected by NTBs and some others not affected. In this case, the effect of non-tariff pro-
tectionism measures is estimated to be non-significant. This lack of effect might reflect product
complementarities in exports at the firm level that are not present at the country level: firms export
a basket of products to a given country and it is costly to adjust only one of these products but not
the others; in contrast, it may be easier to adjust exports of the same product to different countries.
Indeed, there are much less firms exporting several products to the same country in our data, only
5,170 firms against 8,771 exporting the same product to several countries which is the basis of the
estimates in column (5).
In order to gauge the magnitude of the estimated effects, note that the estimated effect of a
protectionism non-tariff measure ranges from -4.8 pp. to -2.4 pp. while the average growth rate in
exports at the firm-product-country level in our data for the year 2010 is 6.5%. This implies that the
estimated effects are not only statistically significant but also economically sizable, as they account
for 74%-37% of average growth in absolute value.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 17 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1814
Table 6 repeats the exercise from Table 5 but including only liberalizing non-tariff measures
rather than protectionist ones. The results reflect that there is indeed a non-linear effect between
liberalization and protectionism non-tariff measures. This finding casts doubt on the assumption
that the effect of protectionism policies on trade is equal to the effect of liberalizing policies but with
opposite sign.
Column (1) in Table 6 analyzes the removal of NTBs for the same triplet firm-product-country.
It indicates that the average growth rate of exports is 3 pp. bigger after the liberalization. However,
comparing with Column (1) of Table 5 we can see that the effect is smaller and statistically non-
significant. Again, in columns (2)-(4) we show that this effect is robust to different combinations of
fixed effects.
Table 6: Effect of liberalizing non-tariff measures on export growth.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
NTMLIBEpd,t−1 0.030 0.009 0.026 0.009 0.001 0.010 0.053 0.001
(s.e.) (0.031) (0.030) (0.032) (0.023) (0.020) (0.022) (0.040) (0.028)
R2 0.24 0.24 0.11 0.22 0.29 0.22 0.43 0.22
# obs 132,381 146,736 165,245 148,320 129,807 148,313 43,855 148,253
# firms 12,564 10,327 14,516 10,439 8,771 10,438 5,170 10,438
# countries 187 188 189 196 196 196 145 184
# products 118 118 118 118 117 117 118 118
Fixed effects:
Firm × country × product YES NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Firm × year NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Firm NO NO YES NO NO NO NO NO
Year YES NO YES NO NO NO NO NO
Product × country NO YES YES NO NO NO NO NO
Product NO NO NO YES NO NO YES YES
Country NO NO NO YES YES YES NO NO
Product × year NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO
Country × year NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES
Firm × product × year NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO
Firm × country × year NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO
Notes. Dependent variable is export growth at the firm-country-product level (Δ lnXipd,t). Sample covers 2009-2013.
Standard errors are clustered at the product-destination level.
Similarly to the exercise with protectionist measures, we include firm × product × year fixed
effect to exploit variation across countries of destination. This is reflected in column (5), where we
observe that the effect is almost negligible and less signficant than that of protectionist measures.
In such a way, average export growth of firms that export to countries removing NTBs is only 0.05
pp. higher than that of firms exporting to countries that keep the measures. As compared to the
decrease in growth of 3.1 pp. estimated in column (5) of Table 5, the effect of the liberalization is
negligible. Hence, export growth is hindered when a NTB is implemented, but its removal does not
necessarily imply an improvement in this situation, which is consistent with the fact that NTB are
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more distortionary than tariff barriers. Column (6) confirms that this effect is robust to a different
configuration of fixed effects.
Finally, column (7) includes fixed effects so that variation takes place across different products.
Thus, we explore the effects of the removal of the NTB for the same firm exporting different products
to the same country. Similarly to protectionist measures, the effect is not statistically significant and
small. Column (8) show that this is robust to another configuration of fixed effects.
All in all, Tables 5 and 6 point to the presence of non-linear effects regarding non-tariff measures.
While protectionism policies exert a negative and significant effect on export growth, the estimated
effects for liberalizing measures are not statistically distinguishable from zero. A plausible expla-
nation for this non-linearity is the existence of two forces that point in the same direction when
protectionist measures are implemented but in opposite directions when they are removed. The
implementation of a protectionist measure in a given country lowers the threshold marginal cost at
which it is profitable to export. Thus, some firms will not be able to export to that country anymore
and will face an adjustment cost to change the destination of their products. These two effects would
explain the strong and statistically significant negative effect that we find. On the other hand, when
the protectionist measure is lifted, despite the increase in the threshold marginal cost at which it is
profitable to export, firms still have to face an adjustment cost to penetrate the formerly protected
market again. This would be consistent with the negligible effect on export growth that we find in
our data since both effects go in opposite directions. Table B.3 in Appendix B confirms this pattern
when both liberalizing and protectionist measures are simultaneously in the regression.
4 Additional exercises at the product-destination level
4.1 The role of tariffs changes
Non-tariff measures may well be implemented in conjunction with other tariff-based measures as a
part of a more general trade policy with a given trade partner and/or product. If this is the case,
omitting tariff changes from the regression would result in biased estimates of the effect of non-tariff
measures on export growth. This is so because NTMs would capture in reality the effect of their
accompanying tariff changes. In order to address this concern, we estimate our baseline specification
but controlling for changes in tariffs:
Δ lnXipd,t = βNTMpd,t−1 + γTariffpd,t−1 + Fixed Effects + υipdt (2)
where X refers to export volume of product p to country d from firm i between year t − 1 and
year t. Tariffpd,t−1 is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if there is at least one tariff measure
affecting product p and country d in year t−1. The tariff measure can be either protectionist (Tariff
increasepd,t−1) or liberalizing (Tariff cutpd,t−1). The remaining elements in equation (2) are defined
in our baseline specification in equation (1).
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It is worth mentioning that our estimates are robust to the inclusion of a continuous variable
of tariff changes and/or levels instead of the two separate dummy variables. However, we prefer
the specification with the two discrete tariff cut and tariff increase variables in order to allow for
the presence of non-linear effects as in the case of NTMs. Also, given that our dependent variable
measures exports growth rather than exports levels, we favor the specification with tariff changes
rather than tariff levels, again in line with the NTMs.
Table 7 reports the estimated effects. Our baseline results in Table 5 hold even when controlling
for tariff measures as well as liberalizing NTMs. The coefficients remain similar in magnitude and
sign to those of the baseline specification. Regarding protectionist measures, the results are very
similar to those of the specification in Table 5 and coefficient estimates prove to be robust to the
inclusion of tariff measures in the regression. Regarding liberalizing measures, the estimated effects
are negligible in most cases and not statistically significant. Therefore, the non-linear result also
holds when we control for tariff measures, while protectionist NTMs harm export growth the effect
of liberalizing NTMs is not significant.
Turning to tariff changes, the estimated effects are not significant in all cases, which probably
points to the lack of enough variation in the data due to the reduced number of tariff changes affecting
Spain over the 2009-2013 period. Finally, it is worth noting that these results are backed as well by
Tables B.4 and B.5 in the Appendix, where we regress export growth on protectionist and liberalizing
non-tariff policies separately while controlling for tariffs.
ulating the products used for public procurement projects). This result also holds when controlling
for liberalizing measures.
Column (2) exploits variation across countries, comparing the rate of growth of exports for the
same firm-product-year triplet in countries with and without NTMs. The categories that present
statistically significant coefficients are again categories A, G and M together with categories B (that
corresponds to technical barriers to trade) and F (that corresponds to measures related to internal
4.2 Results by type of non-tariff measure
We now turn to the analysis of the different types of NTMs in order to identify which policies are the
most harmful. We label the different NTMs in our sample according to the UN MAST classification
(see Appendix A for a detailed description of the different UN MAST categories). Then, we run a
regression as in equation (1) but including a set of 11 NTMs, one for each UN MAST category.
The results are reported in Table 8 where we exploit different fixed effects configurations. When
exploiting variation across time in column (1) by including firm-product-destination fixed effects, cat-
egories A, G and M present statistically significant negative coefficients. These categories correspond
to sanitary measures (barriers on health and environmental standards), finance measures (guarantees
of payment to national industries and such) and government procurement measures (measures reg-
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
NTMPROTpd,t−1 -0.057*** -0.058*** -0.057*** -0.030*** -0.036*** -0.030*** -0.022 -0.017
(s.e.) (0.023) (0.017) (0.019) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.047) (0.013)
NTMLIBEpd,t−1 0.023 0.024 0.024 0.006 -0.011 0.005 0.032 -0.033
(s.e.) (0.034) (0.040) (0.038) (0.031) (0.034) (0.032) (0.061) (0.028)
Tariff increasepd,t−1 -0.017 -0.044 -0.029 -0.019 -0.031 -0.021 0.067 0.002
(s.e.) (0.034) (0.045) (0.035) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.055) (0.019)
Tariff cutpd,t−1 -0.013 -0.012 -0.011 -0.0005 0.002 0.001 -0.012 -0.005
(s.e.) (0.031) (0.024) (0.021) (0.018) (0.017) (0.019) (0.039) (0.017)
R2 0.24 0.24 0.11 0.22 0.29 0.22 0.44 0.22
# obs 132,381 146,736 165,245 148,320 129,807 148,313 43,855 148,253
# firms 12,564 10,327 14,516 10,439 8,771 5,170 2,401 10,438
# countries 187 188 189 196 196 196 145 184
# products 118 118 118 118 117 117 118 118
Fixed effects:
Firm × country × product YES NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Firm × year NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Firm NO NO YES NO NO NO NO NO
Year YES NO YES NO NO NO NO NO
Product × country NO YES YES NO NO NO NO NO
Product NO NO NO YES NO NO YES YES
Country NO NO NO YES YES YES NO NO
Product × year NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO
Country × year NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES
Firm × product × year NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO
Firm × country × year NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO
taxation of imports or price control instruments). All of them exhibit the expected sign except for
price control measures. The latter may reflect a problem of endogeneity, where protectionist measures
are being implemented in those industries which are importing the most from Spanish companies.
This result also holds when we control for tariff measures and differentiate between protectionist and
liberalizing measures.
In such a way, finance (category G) and government procurement (category M) protectionist
measures exhibit statistically significant negative coefficients. It is worth noting that there are few
measures in some of the categories that are significant in Table 8 — see Table A.1 in the Appendix
—, which might cast doubt on the estimates for categories A, B and F. Therefore, we think that
the most robust results are those of categories G and M, corresponding to finance and government
procurement measures.
Finally, in column (3) we present the results when exploiting variation across products. In line
with the results from tables 5 and 6, the effects are not significant for most categories. Only finance
measures remain statistically significant with a negative effect.
Table 7: Effect of non-tariff measures and tariffs on export growth.
Notes. Dependent variable is export growth at the firm-country-product level (Δ lnXipd,t). Sample covers 2009-2013.
Standard errors are clustered at the product-destination level.
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(1) (2) (3)
NTMPROTpd,t−1 (Category A) -0.089*** 0.131** -0.348
(s.e) (0.044) (0.066) (0.369)
NTMPROTpd,t−1 (Category B) -0.081 -0.095** 0.183
(s.e) (0.069) (0.040) (0.211)
NTMPROTpd,t−1 (Category D) 0.086 0.057 0.003
(s.e) (0.096) (0.060) (0.119)
NTMPROTpd,t−1 (Category F) 0.266*** 0.255** -0.072
(s.e) (0.088) (0.081) (0.249)
NTMPROTpd,t−1 (Category E) 0.028 -0.017 0.057
(s.e) (0.094) (0.037) (0.100)
NTMPROTpd,t−1 (Category G) -0.272*** -0.289*** -1.379***
(s.e) (0.037) (0.081) (0.223)
NTMPROTpd,t−1 (Category I) -0.013 0.018 0.057
(s.e) (0.061) (0.048) (0.049)
NTMPROTpd,t−1 (Category L) -0.031 -0.017 -0.029
(s.e) (0.031) (0.019) (0.058)
NTMPROTpd,t−1 (Category M) -0.146*** -0.073*** -0.023
(s.e) (0.052) (0.021) (0.102)
NTMPROTpd,t−1 (Category P) -0.017 -0.035 0.080
(s.e) (0.040) (0.032) (0.047)
NTMPROTpd,t−1 (Category X) 0.019 -0.009 0.061
(s.e) (0.041) (0.026) (0.065)
R2 0.24 0.29 0.43
# obs 132,381 129,807 43,855
# firms 12,564 8,771 5,170
# countries 187 196 145
# products 118 117 118
Fixed effects:
Firm × country × product YES NO NO
Year YES NO NO
Product NO NO YES
Country NO YES NO
Firm × product × year NO YES NO
Firm × country × year NO NO YES
Table 8: Effect of protectionist non-tariff measures on export growth by UN MAST category.
Notes. Dependent variable is export growth at the firm-country-product level (Δ lnXipd,t). Sample covers 2009-
2013. Standard errors are clustered at the product-destination level. Category A = Sanitary and phitosanitary
measures; Category B = Technical barriers to trade; Category D = Contingent protection measures; Category E =
Non-automatic licensing, quotas, prohibitions and qualiy-control measures (other than SPS and TBT); Category F
= Price control measures, including taxes and charges; Category G = Finance measures; Category I = Trade-related
investment measures; Category L = subsidies; Category M = Government procurement measures; Category P =
Export measures; Category X= Unclear instrument
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4.3 Cumulative effects
We have so far focused on annual growth by product-destination as dependent variable. We now turn
to cumulative effects in which the persistence of the non-tariff measures effects is explored. More
concretely, we consider our baseline specification in (1) but substituting the dependent variable
by cumulative growth over 1, 2, and 3 years after implementation of the corresponding non-tariff
measure. Importantly, we restrict our analysis to a sample of permanent firm-product-destinations
triplets, i.e., firm-product-destinations trade relationships that are present in all years 2009-2013.
Table 9: Cumulative effect of non-tariff measures on export growth.
Firm-country-product FE Firm-product-year FE Firm-country-year FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Cumulative growth 1-year 2-year 3-year 1-year 2-year 3-year 1-year 2-year 3-year
NTMPROTpd,t−1 -0.051*** -0.074*** 0.007 -0.048*** -0.067*** 0.009 0.009 0.016 0.052
(s.e.) (0.014) (0.030) (0.006) (0.012) (0.017) (0.026) (0.044) (0.070) (0.075)
NTMLIBEpd,t−1 0.043 0.055* 0.070*** 0.013 0.011 0.025 0.079 0.048 -0.053
(s.e.) (0.032) (0.028) (0.023) (0.027) (0.057) (0.051) (0.129) (0.074) (0.037)
R2 0.15 0.31 0.55 0.31 0.33 0.34 0.46 0.48 0.49
# obs 66,824 63,752 47,046 50,236 47,865 35,306 9,512 8,889 6,511
# firms 5,951 5,951 5,951 2,574 2,574 2,574 640 640 640
# countries 152 152 152 150 150 150 69 69 69
# products 113 113 113 101 101 101 100 100 100
Fixed effects
Firm × country × product YES YES YES NO NO NO NO NO NO
Year YES YES YES NO NO NO NO NO NO
Product NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES
Country NO NO NO YES YES YES NO NO NO
Firm × product × year NO NO NO YES YES YES NO NO NO
Firm × country × year NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES
Notes. Dependent variable is export growth at the firm-country-product level (Δ lnXipd,t) over 1, 2, and 3 years.
Sample covers 2009-2013. Standard errors are clustered at the product-destination level. Sample of permanent
firm-product-destinations triplets.
Table 9 presents the estimated effects of non-tariff measures on cumulative growth. Three findings
are worth highlighting. First, the effects for annual growth in the permanent sample are very similar
to those of the baseline specification in Table 5. Second, when exploiting variation over time for each
firm-country-product triplet (columns 1-3) or variation across destinations for each firm-product-year
triplet (columns 4-6), we find that the statistically significant negative effect of non-tariff barriers is
even larger after two years but vanishes in the third year. When significant, the magnitude of the
estimated effects is sizable. For instance, the 1- and 2-year effects in columns (1) and (2) of -5.1 pp.
and -7.4 pp. can be compared with the sample average cumulative growth 1- and 2-years ahead of
6.3% and 11.6%, respectively. This result may indicate that non-tariff barriers imply an important
cost in the short-run probably due to the uncertainty implied by the protectionism measures, but
firms eventually learn how to overcome the barrier and are able to undo the initial negative shock.
Third, estimates based on variation across products for the same firm-country-year triplet (columns
7-9) remain statistically indistinguishable from zero for all time horizons.
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Finally, the estimated effects of liberalizing non-tariff measures remain statistically insignificant
for the 1-year growth in all the three fixed effects configurations. However, in the case of firm-
country-product fixed effects, the estimated coefficient on liberalizing NTMs becomes positive and
significant, which points to a potentially positive effects of liberalizing measures but only after a
certain lag.
5 Firm-level analysis
We now turn to the analysis at the firm level rather than at the firm-product-destination level. If
firms are able to undo the NTM shocks by increasing their exports to other product-destinations
pairs, the negative impact on export growth at the firm-product-destination level would vanish at the
firm level. In order to investigate this possibility, we consider overall export growth at the firm level
as our dependent variable of interest. To be more concrete, we now consider the following empirical
specification:
Δ lnXi,t = βFNTMi,t−1 + θZi,t−1 + ηi + δt + νi,t (3)
where Δ lnXi,t refers to overall export growth of firm t in year t. Zi,t−1 refers to a set of firm controls,
namely, size and total factor productivity. A set of firm and year fixed effects is also included (ηi
and δt). In addition to export growth at the firm level, we also consider two alternative outcomes as
dependent variable, employment/output growth and productivity growth.
Finally, NTMi,t−1 refers to exposure to non-tariff measures of firm i computed as a weighted







Given the discrete nature of the NTMpd,t−1 variable, the exposure to non-tariff measures at the
firm level (NTMi,t) ranges between zero and one and can be interpreted as the share of firm’s exports
exposed to the implementation of non-tariff measures. The average share in our sample is 7.2% while
the median is 0 and the 90 percentile is 22.2%.
In order to estimate equation (3) we match the Balance of Payments data with firms balance
sheet data from the Spanish Mercantile Register collected by the Central Balance Sheet Office in the
Banco de Espan˜a as well as the SABI (Iberian Balance Sheet Analysis System) database. Using this
balance-sheet information, we compute firms total factor productivity (TFP) following Levinsohn
and Petrin (2003).
Table 10 presents the estimates of equation (3) for the four dependent variables. In a few words,
our results point to a negative and significant effect of non-tariff barriers on export growth at the
firm level that is accompanied by a negative effect on output growth while the effect on employment
growth is not statistically significant. As a result, the effect on firms’ TFP growth is negative,
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significant and sizable. Moreover, the strong power of controls can be gauged from the fact that
R-square goes to 0.21 in column (7) to 0.61 in column (8) without a very small decrease in the
coefficient magnitude. As Altonji et al. (2005) point out, the persistence of a coefficient despite a
substantial increase in regression R-square due to controls provides a strong support for exogeneity
of the right hand side variable of interest.
Table 10: Firm-level effects of non-tariff measures.
Dep. Variable Exports growth Output growth Employment growth TFP growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
NTMPROTi,t−1 -0.045*** -0.045*** -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.005 -0.003 -0.033*** -0.027***
(s.e.) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.013) (0.01)
NTMLIBEi,t−1 0.06 0.05 0.007 0.005 0.024** 0.014 0.018 0.000
(s.e.) (0.05) (0.05) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.020) (0.015)
Average Dep. Variable 0.07 0.09 0.004 0.005 -0.003 0.001 -0.006 -0.006
R2 0.19 0.21 0.24 0.47 0.34 0.55 0.21 0.61
# obs 81,192 59,477 61,092 58,485 63,061 58,886 55,791 55,791
# firms 24,077 17,963 18,484 17,693 18,963 17,791 16,919 16,919
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm Controls NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Notes. Dependent variable is annual growth at the firm level in terms of exports, output, employment, or total factor
productivity (TFP). Sample covers 2009-2013. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 10 exploit the effects of protective and liberalizing NTMs with
and without firm-specific controls. The results show that protectionist NTMs hinder overall export
growth at the firm level. This finding indicates that firms do not compensate the reduction in exports
in the affected product-destinations pairs by increasing their exports to other product-destinations.
The implied cost of NTMs are thus sizable at the firm level. In contrast, the impact of liberalizing
NTMs is statistically insignificant.
Next, we turn to output growth. In line with the results obtained for exports growth, columns (3)
and (4) show that output growth also exhibits negative and statistically significant coefficients when
regressed on protective NTMs and non-significant results regarding liberalizing measures. The results
on employment growth, estimated in Columns (5) and (6) are weaker. The effect of protectionist
measures is negligible while liberalizing measures show a positive and larger effect that becomes
non-significant when controlling for firm characteristics.
Since consumer welfare is hard to measure, firm TFP is usually used as a proxy when estimating
the welfare gains from trade (e.g. Trefler, 2004). Columns (7) and (8) show our estimated harming
effects of trade protectionism in the form of NTMs on productivity. This finding is consistent with the
mechanism that a protectionist measure increases the marginal cost of exporting to the implementing
country. It also diminishes the size of the market to which exporting firms have access. Thus,
we are able to document a sizable harmful effect from protectionism in the form of NTMs, while
liberalizing NTMs seem to have small effects. Turning to liberalizing NTMs, the estimated effects
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on TFP (welfare) are not statistically significant, which confirms the non-linear pattern found at the
product-destination level for exports.
5.1 Aggregate effects
In order to gauge the aggregate impact of the non-tariff protectionism measures, we compare actual
export growth with a counterfactual growth in the absence of non-tariff barriers. For each firm i in
our sample we compute the export growth one would have observed if NTMi,t−1 = 0:
˜Δ lnXi,t = Δ lnXi,t − βˆFNTMi,t−1 (5)
Armed with the firm-specific counterfactual growth (˜Δ lnXi,t), we simply aggregate across all





Figure 2 shows the actual evolution of nominal exports from 2009 to 2013 together with the
counterfactual evolution in the absence of non-tariff barriers. While actual growth was around 11%
per year, our counterfactual indicates that it would have been around 14% per year if non-tariff
barriers would not have been implemented.
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Actual Counterfactual
Notes. Actual refers to annual nominal growth of goods exports. Counterfactual refers to aggregate growth in the
absence of NTBs as computed in equation (6).
6 Concluding remarks
The so-called ’murkier’ protectionism in the form of non-tariff barriers is playing a prominent role in
international trade during the post-crisis era. Policies such as subsidies to local industries, regulations
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favoring domestic firms in public procurements, or financial bailouts represent good examples of non-
tariff measures that might distort trade flows. While the benefits of trade liberalizations in the form
of tariff cuts have been extensively analyzed in the literature, the consequences of the recent increase
in non-tariff barriers are not yet well understood.
By combining non-tariff measures affecting Spain at the product-country level with firm-product-
country information on exports for Spanish firms over the years 2009-2013, this paper provides
empirical evidence in favor of the hypothesis that non-tariff protectionist measures significantly
reduce export growth. The estimated reduction in exports due to non-tariff barriers ranges between
37 and 74% of the average export growth by firm-product-destination in our sample. In contrast, the
impact of liberalizing measures is not statistically significant. Moreover, firm exposure to non-tariff
barriers is associated to lower productivity growth (consumer welfare).
Two main conclusions emerge from these findings according to our interpretation. On the one
hand, the rise of anti-globalization episodes like Trump’s trade threats or Brexit is a legitimate source
of concern given the sizable costs that protectionism non-tariff policies may imply. On the other hand,
the conventional ’symmetry’ assumption made when estimating the effects of protectionism measures
using liberalization-based elasticities may be at odds with the data.
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A More details on the GTA database
In our data we are using the GTA classification which is easily transformed into the UN MAST
categorization. As we observe, the GTA classification is more precise and we have used it on the
data, but the UN MAST will be used for exposition purposes. UN MAST classifies policies from
chapters A to P according to whether policies affect imports (chapters A to O) or exports (P Export-
related measures):11
A Sanitary and phitosanitary measures:Measures that are applied to protect human or animal
life from risks arising from additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-causing organisms in their food;
to protect human life from plant- or animal-carried diseases; to protect animal or plant life from pests,
diseases, or disease-causing organisms; to prevent or limit other damage to a country from the entry,
establishment or spread of pests; and to protect biodiversity. These include measures taken to protect
the health of fish and wild fauna, as well as of forests and wild flora. (GTA database: Sanitary and
phitosanitary measures).
B Technical barriers to trade: Measures referring to technical regulations, and procedures for
assessment of conformity with technical regulations and standards, excluding measures covered by
the SPS Agreement. (GTA database: Technical barriers to trade).
D Contingent trade-protective measures: Measures implemented to counteract particular ad-
verse effects of imports in the market of the importing country, including measures aimed at unfair
foreign trade practices, contingent upon the fulfilment of certain procedural and substantive re-
quirements. (GTA database: Import monitoring, Special safeguard, Safeguard, Anti-subsidy, Anti-
circumvention, Anti-dumping).
E Non automatic licensing, quotas, prohibitions and quantity-control measures: Control
measures generally aimed at restraining the quantity of goods that can be imported, regardless of
whether they come from different sources or one specific supplier. These measures can take the
form of non-automatic licensing, fixing of a predetermined quota, or through prohibitions. Measures
introduced for SPS and TBT reasons are classified in chapters A and B above. (GTA database:
Import licensing requirement, Import tariff quota, Import ban, Import quota).
F Price control measures, including taxes and charges: Measures implemented to control or
affect the prices of imported goods in order to, inter alia, support the domestic price of certain
products when the import prices of these goods are lower; establish the domestic price of certain
products because of price fluctuation in domestic markets, or price instability in a foreign market; or
to increase or preserve tax revenue. This category also includes measures other than tariffs measures
11Since our paper is focused on Spanish data, we have omitted the categories where Spain was not affected.
that increase the cost of imports in a similar manner, i.e. by fixed percentage or by a fixed amount.
They are also known as para-tariff measures. (GTA database: Internal taxation of imports).
FDI: Measures related to investment of foreign companies. (GTA database: FDI measures, FDI:
Financial incentive, FDI: Treatment and operations, FDI: Entry and ownership rule).
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G Finance measures: Finance measures are intended to regulate the access to and cost of foreign
exchange for imports and define the terms of payment. They may increase import costs in the same
manner as tariff measures. (GTA database: Competitive devaluation, Trade payment measure.)
I Trade-related investment measures: It includes local content measures and measures aimed at
trade-balancing. (GTA database: Local sourcing, Trade balancing measure, Localisation incentive,
Local labour, Local operations).
X Instrument unclear: Instruments which do not fall under any of the previous classifications.
(GTA database: Import-related non-tariff measure, Instrument unclear).
L Subsidies: Financial contribution by a government or public body, or via government entrustment
or direction of a private body (direct or potential direct transfer of funds: e.g. grant, loan, equity
infusion, guarantee; government revenue foregone; provision of goods or services or purchase of goods;
payments to a funding mechanism), or income or price support, which confers a benefit and is specific
(to an enterprise or industry or group thereof, or limited to a designated geographical region). (GTA
database: Bailout (capital injection or equity participation), State loan, Financial grant, In-kind
grant, Production subsidy, Interest payment subsidy, Loan guarantee, Tax or social insurance relief,
Consumption subsidy, Import incentive, Financial assistance in foreign market, State aid, nes, Price
stabilisation).
M Government measures: Measures controlling the purchase of goods by government agencies,
generally by preferring national providers. (GTA database: Public procurement access, Public pro-
curement preference margin, Public procurement localisation, Public procurement, nes)
N Intellectual Property: Measures protecting intellectual property. (GTA database: Intellectual
property measures).
P Export measures: Export-related measures are measures applied by the government of the ex-
porting country on exported goods. (GTA database: Export ban, Export tariff quota, Export quota,
Export licensing requirement, Export tax, Tax-based export incentive, Export subsidy, Trade finance,
Other export incentive, Export-related non-tariff measure, nes).
In Table A.1, we can observe the type of protectionist policies that most have affected the Spanish
products. GTA database uses a slightly more disaggregated classification which is close to the UN
MAST classification. As we observe, after the financial collapse of 2008, governments have been
actively intervening in trade regulation. The most used measures fall under categories M, L and
P according to the UN MAST classification. That is, governments have been supporting domestic
firms mainly through conditions on public procurement, state subsidies for international markets and
tax-based incentives to trade. All these non-tariff measures hinder competition in local markets by
making foreign products less competitive or increase international penetration of national producers
by decreasing their costs through subsidies and public protection. In our data, we have included
a total of 45 categories according to the GTA classification that affected Spain during the 2008-13
period.
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Table A.1: Number of NTBs that affected Spain by GTA category.
UN MAST CLASSIFICATION Total NTBs Liberalizing Protectionist Indeterminate
Category A 5 - 4 1
Category B 13 6 6 1
Category D 85 2 83 -
Category E 176 - 130 46
Category F 46 40 6 -
Category G 107 20 87 -
Category I 171 7 161 3
Category L 520 45 433 42
Category M 474 11 453 10
Category P 1619 156 1321 142
Category X 121 34 77 10
In order to conclude with the description of the protectionist policies that have been used in our
analysis, we present Table A.2. This table shows the exports at risk due to protectionist measures.
To generate these numbers, we go through each intervention and calculate the amount of trade
affected by importing country, exporting country and HS category. However, these amounts do not
refer to the year in question, as the volume may be affected by these measures. Instead, we take a
base year and calculate the exports at risk for that year. As we observe, there was a huge rise in the
percentage of exports at risk due to NTBs from the beginning of the crisis until now. Particularly,
NTBs put at stake almost a 40% of Spanish exports in 2009, while in 2016, it was a 66%. We observe
how the Export measures category explains most of the risk followed by Subsidies and Government
procurement. Investment measures related to local content requirements also experienced a big
growth during the period. On the other hand, it is also interesting to see that tariff measures did not
increase substantially and their explicative power in the percentage of exports at risk is rather low.
This also happens for other European economies such as Germany, France or Italy but developing
economies also experience a similar phenomenon. Hence, we believe that the use of NTBs as a proxy
for protectionism is justified and empirically consistent. NTBs are the most important trade policy
instrument that countries have used in order to put restrictions on to foreign trade. In addition,
the evolution of tariffs has been rather positive during the last years and slightly biased towards
liberalizing (see Table 4). Thus, countries are turning to a murkier way of protectionism, that is
much more difficult to detect and has been much less studied, which constitutes a motivation for the
present paper.
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Table A.2: Spanish exports at risk due to NTBs.
UN MAST Foreign discriminatory Percentage of Spain’s exports at risk due to...
chapter policy instrument 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
All instruments 40.20% 54.33% 58.79% 63.02% 64.46% 66.37% 66.13% 68.30%
D Contingent trade protection 0.03% 0.06% 0.06% 0.09% 0.11% 0.15% 0.18% 0.15%
E Non-automatic licensing, quotas 0.22% 0.44% 0.57% 0.64% 1.79% 0.73% 1.01% 0.94%
F Price control measures 0.06% 0.06% 0.08% 0.10% 0.11% 0.13% 0.22% 0.27%
G Finance measures 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
I Investment measures 0.26% 5.08% 6.37% 6.73% 6.71% 6.93% 7.33% 7.46%
L Subsidies (except export subsidies) 6.87% 11.81% 8.93% 12.56% 13.83% 16.49% 17.25% 20.16%
M Government procurement 1.27% 1.62% 1.77% 2.43% 2.51% 2.67% 2.86% 3.07%
P Export measures 35.70% 45.36% 50.37% 54.86% 55.90% 55.96% 55.97% 57.73%
Import tariff increases 0.36% 0.61% 0.70% 1.01% 1.61% 1.66% 1.80% 2.04%
Instrument unclassified 0.04% 0.36% 0.43% 0.46% 0.52% 0.59% 0.70% 0.76%
B Additional results
Table B.3: Effect of protectionist and liberalizing non-tariff measures on export growth.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
NTMPROTpd,t−1 -0.049*** -0.046*** -0.047*** -0.023*** -0.028*** -0.023*** -0.006 -0.011
(s.e.) (0.018) (0.017) (0.015) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.045) (0.012)
NTMLIBEpd,t−1 -0.004 -0.022 0.002 -0.022 -0.042 -0.023 0.063 -0.050
(s.e.) (0.043) (0.021) (0.025) (0.026) (0.027) (0.025) (0.050) (0.029)
R2 0.24 0.24 0.11 0.22 0.29 0.22 0.44 0.22
# obs 132,381 146,736 165,245 148,320 129,807 148,313 43,855 148,253
# firms 12,564 10,327 14,516 10,439 8,771 10,438 5,170 10,438
# countries 187 188 189 196 196 196 106 184
# products 118 118 118 118 117 117 116 118
Fixed effects:
Firm × country × product YES NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Firm × year NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Firm NO NO YES NO NO NO NO NO
Year YES NO YES NO NO NO NO NO
Product × country NO YES YES NO NO NO NO NO
Product NO NO NO YES NO NO YES YES
Country NO NO NO YES YES YES NO NO
Product × year NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO
Country × year NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES
Firm × product × year NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO
Firm × country × year NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO
Notes. Dependent variable is export growth at the firm-country-product level (Δ lnXipd,t). Sample covers 2009-2013.
Standard errors are clustered at the product-destination level.
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Table B.4: Effect of protectionist non-tariff measures and tariffs on export growth.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
NTBpd,t−1 -0.047** -0.047*** -0.046** -0.025*** -0.032*** -0.025*** 0.0004 -0.014
(s.e.) (0.020) (0.013) (0.015) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.048) (0.010)
Tariffpd,t−1 -0.059** -0.010 -0.041** 0.0004 0.001 0.003 -0.083** 0.020
(s.e.) (0.012) (0.018) (0.013) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.042) (0.020)
R2 0.24 0.24 0.11 0.22 0.29 0.22 0.43 0.22
# obs 132,381 146,736 165,245 148,320 129,807 148,313 43,855 148,253
# firms 12,564 10,327 14,516 10,439 8,771 10,438 5,170 10,438
# countries 187 188 189 196 196 196 145 184
# products 118 118 118 118 117 117 118 118
Fixed effects:
Firm × country × product YES NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Firm × year NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Firm NO NO YES NO NO NO NO NO
Year YES NO YES NO NO NO NO NO
Product × country NO YES YES NO NO NO NO NO
Product NO NO NO YES NO NO YES YES
Country NO NO NO YES YES YES NO NO
Product × year NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO
Country × year NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES
Firm × product × year NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO
Firm × country × year NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO
Notes. Dependent variable is export growth at the firm-country-product level (Δ lnXipd,t). Sample covers 2009-2013.
Standard errors are clustered at the product-destination level.
Table B.5: Effect of liberalizing non-tariff measures and tariffs on export growth.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
NTBpd,t−1 0.029 0.008 0.025 0.009 0.001 0.010 0.050 0.0005
(s.e.) (0.031) (0.030) (0.031) (0.022) (0.020) (0.022) (0.036) (0.027)
Tariffpd,t−1 -0.062*** -0.014 -0.044* -0.003 -0.004 -0.0003 -0.080* -0.022
(s.e.) (0.008) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.046) (0.020)
R2 0.24 0.24 0.11 0.22 0.29 0.22 0.43 0.22
# obs 132,381 146,736 165,245 148,320 129,807 148,313 43,855 148,253
# firms 12,564 10,327 14,516 10,439 8,771 10,438 5,170 10,438
# countries 187 188 189 196 196 196 145 184
# products 118 118 118 118 117 117 118 118
Fixed effects:
Firm × country × product YES NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Firm × year NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Firm NO NO YES NO NO NO NO NO
Year YES NO YES NO NO NO NO NO
Product × country NO YES YES NO NO NO NO NO
Product NO NO NO YES NO NO YES YES
Country NO NO NO YES YES YES NO NO
Product × year NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO
Country × year NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES
Firm × product × year NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO
Firm × country × year NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO
Notes. Dependent variable is export growth at the firm-country-product level (Δ lnXipd,t). Sample covers 2009-2013.
Standard errors are clustered at the product-destination level.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA PUBLICATIONS 
WORKING PAPERS  
1701  JAVIER ANDRÉS, JAVIER J. PÉREZ and JUAN A. ROJAS: Implicit public debt thresholds: an empirical exercise 
for the case of Spain.
1702  LUIS J. ÁLVAREZ: Business cycle estimation with high-pass and band-pass local polynomial regression.
1703  ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO, PAUL ALLISON and RICHARD WILLIAMS: Dynamic panel data modelling using maximum 
likelihood: an alternative to Arellano-Bond.
1704  MIKEL BEDAYO: Creating associations as a substitute for direct bank credit. Evidence from Belgium.
1705  MARÍA DOLORES GADEA-RIVAS, ANA GÓMEZ-LOSCOS and DANILO LEIVA-LEON: The evolution of regional 
economic interlinkages in Europe.
1706  ESTEBAN GARCÍA-MIRALLES: The crucial role of social welfare criteria for optimal inheritance taxation.
1707  MÓNICA CORREA-LÓPEZ and RAFAEL DOMÉNECH: Service regulations, input prices and export volumes: evidence 
from a panel of manufacturing fi rms.
1708  MARÍA DOLORES GADEA, ANA GÓMEZ-LOSCOS and GABRIEL PÉREZ-QUIRÓS: Dissecting US recoveries.
1709  CARLOS SANZ: Direct democracy and government size: evidence from Spain.
1710  HENRIQUE S. BASSO and JAMES COSTAIN: Fiscal delegation in a monetary union: instrument assignment 
and stabilization properties.
1711 IVÁN KATARYNIUK and JAIME MARTÍNEZ-MARTÍN: TFP growth and commodity prices in emerging economies.
1712  SEBASTIAN GECHERT, CHRISTOPH PAETZ and PALOMA VILLANUEVA: Top-down vs. bottom-up? Reconciling 
the effects of tax and transfer shocks on output.
1713  KNUT ARE AASTVEIT, FRANCESCO FURLANETTO and FRANCESCA LORIA: Has the Fed responded to house 
and stock prices? A time-varying analysis.
1714  FÁTIMA HERRANZ GONZÁLEZ and CARMEN MARTÍNEZ-CARRASCAL: The impact of fi rms’ fi nancial position on 
fi xed investment and employment. An analysis for Spain.
1715  SERGIO MAYORDOMO, ANTONIO MORENO, STEVEN ONGENA and MARÍA RODRÍGUEZ-MORENO: “Keeping it 
personal” or “getting real”? On the drivers and effectiveness of personal versus real loan guarantees.
1716  FRANCESCO FURLANETTO and ØRJAN ROBSTAD: Immigration and the macroeconomy: some new empirical evidence.
1717  ALBERTO FUERTES: Exchange rate regime and external adjustment: an empirical investigation for the U.S.
1718  CRISTINA GUILLAMÓN, ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO and SERGIO PUENTE: High growth fi rms in employment and 
productivity: dynamic interactions and the role of fi nancial constraints.
1719  PAULO SOARES ESTEVES and ELVIRA PRADES: On domestic demand and export performance in the euro area 
countries: does export concentration matter?
1720  LUIS J. ÁLVAREZ and ANA GÓMEZ-LOSCOS: A menu on output gap estimation methods.
1721  PAULA GIL, FRANCISCO MARTÍ, JAVIER J. PÉREZ, ROBERTO RAMOS and RICHARD MORRIS: The output effects 
of tax changes: narrative evidence from Spain.
1722  RICARDO GIMENO and ALFREDO IBÁÑEZ: The eurozone (expected) infl ation: an option’s eyes view.
1723  MIGUEL ANTÓN, SERGIO MAYORDOMO and MARÍA RODRÍGUEZ-MORENO: Dealing with dealers: sovereign 
CDS comovements.
1724  JOSÉ MANUEL MONTERO: Pricing decisions under fi nancial frictions: evidence from the WDN survey.
1725 MARIO ALLOZA: The impact of taxes on income mobility.
1726  DANILO LEIVA-LEON: Measuring business cycles intra-synchronization in US: a regime-switching interdependence 
framework.
1727  PIERRE GUÉRIN and DANILO LEIVA-LEON: Model averaging in Markov-Switching models: predicting national 
recessions with regional data .
1728  MÁXIMO CAMACHO and DANILO LEIVA-LEON: The propagation of industrial business cycles.
1729  JAMES COSTAIN: Costly decisions and sequential bargaining.
1730  MARIO ALLOZA: Is fi scal policy more effective in uncertain times or during recessions?
1731 PIERRE GUÉRIN and DANILO LEIVA-LEON: Monetary policy, stock market and sectoral comovement. 
1732  HENRIK JENSEN, IVAN PETRELLA, SØREN HOVE RAVN and EMILIANO SANTORO: Leverage and deepening 
business cycle skewness.
1733  CÉSAR MARTÍN MACHUCA: External stress early warning indicators.
1734  RODOLFO G. CAMPOS: International migration pressures in the long run.
1735  ANDREA ARIU, ELENA BIEWEN, SVEN BLANK, GUILLAUME GAULIER, MARÍA JESÚS GONZÁLEZ, PHILIPP MEINEN, 
DANIEL MIRZA, CÉSAR MARTÍN MACHUCA and PATRY TELLO: Firm heterogeneity and aggregate business services 
exports: micro evidence from Belgium, France, Germany and Spain.
1736  LEONARDO GAMBACORTA, STEFANO SCHIAFFI and ADRIAN VAN RIXTEL: Changing business models in 
international bank funding.
1737  ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO and FRANCESCA VIANI: An anatomy of the Spanish current account adjustment: the role 
of permanent and transitory factors.
1738  MARÍA J. NIETO and LARRY D. WALL: Cross-border banking on the two sides of the Atlantic: does it have an impact 
on bank crisis management?
1739  JACOPO TIMINI: Currency unions and heterogeneous trade effects: the case of the Latin Monetary Union.
1740  PAULINO FONT, MARIO IZQUIERDO and SERGIO PUENTE: Subsidising mature age employment or throwing coins 
into a wishing well: a quasi-experimental analysis.
1741  THOMAS FUJIWARA and CARLOS SANZ: Norms in bargaining: evidence from government formation in Spain.
1742  ENRIQUE ALBEROLA, ÁNGEL ESTRADA and FRANCESCA VIANI: Global imbalances from a stock perspective.
1743  ÓSCAR ARCE, RICARDO GIMENO and SERGIO MAYORDOMO: Making room for the needy: the credit-reallocation 
effects of the ECB’s corporate QE.
1744  M. D. GADEA-RIVAS, ANA GÓMEZ-LOSCOS and EDUARDO BANDRÉS: Clustering regional business cycles.
1745  NEZIH GUNER, YULIYA KULIKOVA and JOAN LLULL: Marriage and health: selection, protection, and assortative mating.
1746  SERGIO MAYORDOMO and MARÍA RODRÍGUEZ-MORENO: Did the bank capital relief induced by the supporting 
factor enhance SME lending?
1747  KATALIN BODNÁR, LUDMILA FADEJEVA, MARCO HOEBERICHTS, MARIO IZQUIERDO PEINADO, CHRISTOPHE 
JADEAU and ELIANA VIVIANO: Credit shocks and the European Labour market.
1748  PIERRE GUÉRIN, DANILO LEIVA-LEON and MASSIMILIANO MARCELLINO: Markov-switching three-pass 
regression fi lter.
1749 ISABEL ARGIMÓN: Decentralized multinational banks and risk taking: the Spanish experience in the crisis.
1750 BING XU: Permissible collateral and access to finance: evidence from a quasi-natural experiment.
1751 GERGELY AKOS GANICS: Optimal density forecast combinations.
1801  OLYMPIA BOVER, LAURA HOSPIDO and ERNESTO VILLANUEVA: The impact of high school financial education on 
financial knowledge and choices: evidence from a randomized trial in Spain.
1802  IGNACIO HERNANDO, IRENE PABLOS, DANIEL SANTABÁRBARA and JAVIER VALLÉS: Private Saving. New Cross-
Country Evidence Based on Bayesian Techniques.
1803  PABLO AGUILAR and JESÚS VÁZQUEZ: Term structure and real-time learning.
1804  MORITZ A. ROTH: International co-movements in recessions.
1805  ANGELA ABBATE and DOMINIK THALER: Monetary policy and the asset risk-taking channel.
1806  PABLO MARTÍN-ACEÑA: Money in Spain. New historical statistics. 1830-1998.
1807  GUILHERME BANDEIRA: Fiscal transfers in a monetary union with sovereign risk.
1808  MIGUEL GARCÍA-POSADA GÓMEZ: Credit constraints, fi rm investment and growth: evidence from survey data.
1809  LAURA ALFARO, MANUEL GARCÍA-SANTANA and ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO: On the direct and indirect real 
effects of credit supply shocks.
1810  ROBERTO RAMOS and CARLOS SANZ: Backing the incumbent in diffi cult times: the electoral impact of wildfi res.
1811  GABRIEL JIMÉNEZ, ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO and RAQUEL VEGAS: Bank lending standards over the cycle: 
the role of fi rms’ productivity and credit risk.
1812  JUAN S. MORA-SANGUINETTI and ROK SPRUK: Industry vs services: do enforcement institutions matter for 
specialization patterns? Disaggregated evidence from Spain.
1813  JAMES CLOYNE, CLODOMIRO FERREIRA and PAOLO SURICO: Monetary policy when households have debt: new 
evidence on the transmission mechanism.
1814  DMITRI KIRPICHEV and ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO: The costs of trade protectionism: evidence from Spanish fi rms 
and non-tariff measures.
Unidad de Servicios Auxiliares
Alcalá, 48 - 28014 Madrid
E-mail: publicaciones@bde.es
www.bde.es
